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ABSTRACT 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) payload 
space flight missions involve cooperative work between 
NASA and partners including spacecraft (or payload) 
contractors, universities, nonprofit research centers, 
Agency payload organization, Range Safety 
organization, Agency launch service organizations, and 
launch vehicle contractors.  The role of NASA’s Safety 
and Mission Assurance (SMA) Directorate is typically 
fairly straightforward, but when a mission’s partnerships 
become more complex, to realize cost and science 
benefits (e.g., multi-agency payload(s) or cooperative 
international missions), the task of ensuring payload 
safety becomes much more challenging.  This paper 
discusses lessons learned from NASA safety 
professionals working multiple-agency missions and 
offers suggestions to help fellow safety professionals 
working multiple-agency missions. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) routinely collaborates with partners including 
spacecraft (or payload) contractors, universities, 
nonprofit research centers, Agency payload organization, 
Range Safety organization, Agency launch service 
organizations, and launch vehicle contractors.  NASA 
depends on the Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) 
Payload Safety Program to manage the Agency’s 
interests in safety and mission success for these joint 
efforts.     
NASA’s ELV Payload Safety Program was originally 
developed in response to events that occurred during the 
Cloud-Aerosol LIDAR and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite 
Observation (CALIPSO) mission.  CALIPSO can be 
seen in Figure 1.  CALIPSO was a joint science mission 
between NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and Centre 
National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES).  This multi-agency 
mission between NASA and CNES was also a dual 
payload mission since CALIPSO was launched with 
CLOUDSAT, another cloud and aerosol observer 
satellite.  CloudSat used a Cloud Profiling Radar (CPR) 
instrument, a 94-GHz nadir-looking radar, to measure the 
power backscattered by clouds as a function of distance 
from the radar.  The design of the CPR was developed 
jointly by NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the 
Canadian Space Agency (CSA).  
 
 
Figure 1. CALIPSO spacecraft 
 
CALIPSO demonstrates well the importance and 
challenges of performing cross-agency safety 
engineering and safety coordination.  As the mission 
progressed, concerns were raised involving design 
requirements that threatened to delay the mission.  One 
of the biggest challenges of joint missions is meeting 
multiple sets of safety requirements, especially those that 
cross agencies.  However, in this particular case, the 
disagreement primarily existed within NASA.  Alcatel 
Space Industries manufactured the off-the-shelf, 
hydrazine-fueled Proteus propulsion bus used by 
CALIPSO.  CNES provided the spacecraft bus as part of 
their in-kind contribution to the joint mission.  Even 
though NASA JPL had used the Proteus propulsion bus 
for a previous oceanography mission, Jason-1, without a 
safety concern, GSFC Safety and Mission Assurance 
(SMA) believed that the threaded fittings in the Proteus 
propulsion system did not meet NASA fault tolerance 
design guidelines.  SMA at JPL and other NASA Centers 
did not necessarily agree with GSFC SMA’s position.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160006487 2019-08-31T03:06:42+00:00Z
The existing payload safety review and approval process 
at the time was not sufficiently prepared to handle GSFC 
SMA’s safety concern with CALIPSO’s Proteus bus.  A 
safety concern that should have been addressed at a much 
lower level of decision-making was left unnoticed until 
late in processing, and the NASA Chief of SMA, Center 
Directors, Air Force Range Safety, CALIPSO Project 
Manager, and other upper level managers were forced to 
intervene to resolve the issue.  Ultimately the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was brought in to 
independently assess the Proteus propulsion bus threaded 
fittings safety concern, and the NESC generated a report 
with recommended safety requirements to aid in the safe 
processing of CALIPSO (RP-04-01/03-001-E) and future 
Proteus bus missions. 
 
2.  NASA’S ELV PAYLOAD SAFETY PROGRAM 
 
NASA recognized an opportunity for improvement 
following CALIPSO and established NASA’s ELV 
Payload Safety Program in May 2008 to ensure the safety 
of personnel and resources from hazards associated with 
NASA payloads flying on unmanned ELVs.  The 
Program does not cover safety during flight operations or 
payloads going to the International Space Station.  The 
Program seeks to improve NASA safety review and 
approval process, and delineates clear roles and 
responsibilities for those involved in ensuring payload 
safety.  The Program also improves and formalizes 
NASA’s payload safety review and approval processes, 
establishes formal decision-making authorities, and 
clarifies a process for handling dissenting opinions. 
 
NASA’s ELV Payload Safety Program consists of a 
fulltime ELV Payload Safety Manager with a safety 
engineer support contractor and a part-time Agency 
Team.  Agency Team members are payload safety 
managers located at GSFC, NASA Headquarters, JPL, 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Wallops Flight 
Facility (WFF).  The Agency Team helps ensure 
consistent application of payload safety requirements 
across the Agency for NASA ELV payloads.  
 
NASA’s ELV Payload Safety Program has two primary 
documents.  The first, a NASA Procedural Requirements 
document, NPR 8715.7, Expendable Launch Vehicle 
Payload Safety Program, provides the payload safety 
review and approval process and related roles and 
responsibilities.  The second is a NASA Standard, 
NASA-STD 8719.24, NASA Expendable Launch 
Vehicle Payload Safety Requirements, written jointly 
with U.S. Air Force Range Safety since most NASA 
payloads are launched from the Air Force’s Eastern and 
Western Ranges.  A joint Air Force/NASA team tailored 
AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements 
and incorporated applicable NASA safety requirements 
to form NASA-STD 8719.24. 
 
 
3.  METHODS UDRF TO FACILITATE SAFE AND 
SUCCESSFUL NASA ELV PAYLAOD MISSIONS  
While multi-agency and international cooperative 
missions offer challenges, the benefits justify the effort.  
International cooperation is a cornerstone principle of 
NASA’s activities and has been part of NASA since its 
inception.  The 2010 National Space Policy of the U.S. 
of America lists as one of the goals to expand 
international cooperation on mutually beneficial space 
activities.  The benefits from leveraging partner funding 
and capabilities through multi-agency missions are 
numerous.  Cooperative research objectives between 
partners can be efficiently accomplished with access to 
an increased number of talented engineers and scientists.  
Additionally, the overall cost of research can be shared 
and reduced while facilitating wider distribution of 
research and science data.  It is easy to see why multi-
agency missions will continue, especially in years of 
smaller agency budgets.   
 
Agencies wishing to benefit from cooperative missions 
have several hurdles to overcome to ensure safety and 
mission success.  While participants in joint partnership 
have individual goals, it is important to realize that all 
members have the same basic objective: a safe and 
successful launch of the payload.  In working toward that 
goal, the safety requirements used by all members of the 
joint effort are similar.  It is the coordination and 
communication of the payload safety review and 
approval process and the resolution of non-similar safety 
requirements that require more time and effort to resolve. 
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Recognizing this, partners need to understand that 
performing payload safety for joint missions requires a 
different approach than missions involving a single 
agency.  Most importantly, partners need to recognize 
that time, as much as an additional 50% or more, is 
required to overcome the challenges associated with joint 
missions.  Challenges include:   
• Confirming that all safety concerns have been 
addressed.  With varying levels of experience in joint 
missions, it may take time to define and explain roles and 
responsibilities and educate about payload safety 
requirements and safety review processes.   
• Coordinating between multiple Centers, 
contractors, and agencies and facilitating necessary 
safety discussions. 
• Multiple lines of management may need to 
review and approve mission processes.   
• Communication between partners is not always 
easy to accomplish when international partners work 
cooperatively, and basic communication can become 
difficult when language barriers exist.   
• Small misunderstandings can halt progress, and 
upper-level managers of partner organizations working 
toward milestone goals do not want these items to 
become show-stoppers that delay launch operations.   
• There are financial and legal aspects to consider, 
and establishing contracts and agreements takes time.   
 
NASA ELV Payload Safety has implemented processes 
to avoid these common pitfalls.   
 
3.1 Payload Safety Working Group 
 
The standing Payload Safety Review Panel used by 
Shuttle Program was expensive to maintain but worked 
well for a program with funding to support it.  NASA 
ELV Payload projects do not have funding to support a 
standing panel, so a more cost-effective, mission-specific 
Payload Safety Working Group (PSWG) is formed for 
each NASA ELV payload project.   The PSWG is made 
up of safety engineers representing the various 
organizations involved in the mission.  These typically 
include the payload project system safety engineer, the 
payload contractor safety engineer, the launch site range 
safety engineer, the launch vehicle contractor system 
safety engineer, the payload processing facility safety 
engineer, and the NASA Launch Services Program 
system safety engineer who often chairs the PSWG.  
Figure 2 shows the typical members of a PSWG in blue 
with green indicating specialists that may be called in to 
assist when needed. 
 
 
Figure 2. Payload Safety Working Group 
 
Each mission generally has four safety review milestones 
in which the PSWG is involved.  Additional review 
meetings may be held depending on the complexity and 
hazards related to the mission.  It is not uncommon to 
hold several meetings to complete one of these safety 
reviews.  The safety review process is kicked off with a 
Payload Safety Introductory Briefing (PSIB) held early 
in the preliminary design phase.  The PSIB is followed 
by Safety Review I occurring around the Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR), Safety Review II held around the 
Critical Design Review (CDR), and Safety Review III 
completed prior to shipping the payload to the launch site 
processing area. 
 
The payload organization provides safety data packages 
to the PSWG for review in accordance with the mission-
specific tailored NASA-STD 8719.24 Annex.  Hazards 
are identified and abated to the satisfaction of the PSWG 
members.  When the PSWG has issues or needs 
assistance, the ELV Payload Safety Program Agency 
Team is available to step in and help.  Hazards are 
identified and documented along with agreed-to 
abatement actions on Hazard Reports (NASA Form NF 
1825).  Open safety verification actions are tracked until 
closed on a Safety Verification Tracking Log (SVTL). 
 
NASA’s ELV payload safety review and approval 
process finishes with the signing and distribution of the 
Mission’s Certificate of ELV Payload Safety 
Compliance.  From this point forward, local safety 
professionals, most of whom were on or represented on 
the PSWG, ensure safety during payload processing 
operations in their jurisdictions and the SVTL is closed 
out.   
  
3.2 Trilateral Safety and Mission Assurance Payload 
Safety Task Force 
  
The European Space Agency (ESA), Japanese Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA) and NASA established a 
Trilateral SMA in 2008 to enhance the success of our 
cooperative programs.  At the first Trilateral SMA 
Conference in April 2008 (TRISMAC 2008), a 
recommendation was made to establish a Payload Safety 
Task Force (PSTF) to compare payload safety 
requirements used by the agencies.  NASA hosted the 
first PSTF meeting in April 2009 at the Kennedy Space 
Center.  Since then, PSTF meetings (mostly telephone 
conferences) have occurred.  The U.S. Air Force 
participated in some of these meetings.  To date the 
meetings have focused on general payload safety and 
fault tolerances, propulsion and pressure systems safety 
requirements, pyrotechnics safety requirements, and 
payload safety review processes. 
 
In general, the payload safety requirements used by ESA, 
JAXA and NASA, including the U.S. Air Force, were 
similar.  A hazard is a hazard regardless of where you are 
in the world or in space.  Fault tolerance requirements are 
largely the same once agreement is reached on hazard 
level classification (catastrophic, critical, or marginal).  
Hazardous energies and materials used in the spacecraft 
(payload) and payload processing are recognized, 
addressed, and abated in similar fashions.  Each agency 
has a comprehensive safety review and approval process 
with some slight differences.  NASA uses a mission-
specific PSWG safety review approach composed of the 
safety engineers involved in the mission.  JAXA uses a 
standing System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) approach 
where the SSRP is staffed by SMA engineers and experts.  
Both safety review and approval processes achieve 
similar results.    
 
4.0 LESSONS LEARNED FROM MULTI-AGENCY 
MISSIONS 
 
Many of the lessons learned by NASA’s experience are 
applicable to any organization participating in joint 
missions.  Addressing the following common obstacles 
allows these organizations to optimize the benefits of 
cooperative missions. 
 
4.1 Early Planning 
 
As in any mission, planning is needed to allow for a 
viable safety review and approval process.  For multi-
agency missions, expect (and plan) to spend more time 
on planning.  The mission safety professional must 
initiate planning, coordination, and communication 
activities with their mission partners involved in safety 
early in the project life cycle. 
 
The mission safety engineer should try to be involved in 
the development of the mission contracts and cooperative 
agreements to ensure appropriate safety program 
requirements will be included and implemented.  If this 
is not possible, the safety engineer should review and 
understand the existing contracts and cooperative 
agreements.  Mission safety professionals should 
consider writing additional agreements to aid in the 
safety review process when needed or feasible.  These 
safety agreements should define roles, responsibilities, 
processes, and schedule.  An agreement could even be 
used to bring in third party support or expertise to 
augment the safety team and the safety review process.    
 
Plan to establish temporary agreements allowing 
contractors to converse and communicate with 
international team members early in the process.  For the 
United States and often other nations performing 
international work, contractors are required to have a 
signed Technical Assistance Agreements (TAA) 
approved by the U.S. Department of State.  Without 
agreement documents, contractors are not authorized to 
talk directly to international team members.  Processing 
the TAA approvals may require six months to one year, 
so early submittal of the TAA request is recommended.  
Additionally, most space agencies and companies require 
nondisclosure agreements signed by team members and 
management.  
 
By establishing your safety review team and review 
processes, obtaining required facility access training, and 
obtaining necessary TAAs to comply with any local 
launch site requirements, these common causes of delays 
can be avoided.   
 
4.2 Export Control Considerations 
 
International Trafficking Arms Regulations (ITAR) must 
also be managed.  Meeting ITAR regulations involves: 
 
• Understanding governing regulations 
• Training safety team members 
• Identifying possible avenues for ITAR violations 
• Establishing contacts and dialog with ITAR experts and   
legal representatives 
• Applying early for export licenses 
 
There are four organizations that work internationally to 
prevent and control the export of anything used for 
making or delivery of nuclear chemical or biological 
weapons.  Missile Technology Control Regime operates 
as one of those four organizations staffed by multiple 
countries from the United Nations.  Rocket technology 
falls under the category of missile delivery systems.  
Specifically International Trafficking Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) state the restrictions on missile technology.  U.S. 
Department of State’s responsibility includes ITAR.   
 
ITAR expands to twenty-five categories.  Training 
personnel on ITAR specifics concerning their work is 
extremely important.  Companies and agencies often 
create ITAR education for their personnel.  NASA 
Export Control Program further educates, regulates, and 
monitors ITAR applying to NASA programs and 
projects.  Projects with international involvement or 
having plans to transfer information internationally 
require an export license outlining and documenting 
specific information for transfer.  Allowing access to 
missile technology information in any media violates 
ITAR.   
 
Many methods exist for export other than transfer of an 
actual physical item.  Telephone calls, data transmission, 
casual conversation, and presentations are considered 
export of information.  ITAR violations may result in 
harsh consequences including company fines, individual 
fines, and jail sentences.  Verifying nationality status for 
members in the partnership is crucial to prevent ITAR 
violations.  Enacting an export control plan within 
mission teams helps prevent accidental violation of 
regulations.  Laziness and ignorance, not only malicious 
intent, could lead to illegal technology transfer.  Proper 
ITAR planning and vigilance will allow for ITAR and 
payload safety compliance while maintaining mission 
schedule. 
 
The following ITAR-related actions are recommended in 
planning an international project:  
 
• Read governing regulations, and effectively train 
personnel 
• Identify possible avenues for ITAR violations 
• When possible, employ an export control expert or 
consult an expert 
• Apply early for export licenses from state department 
or governing authority 
• Keep information concerning regulated items on secure 
controlled date storage devices 
• Contact lawyers or export control experts when 
questions arise in the duration of the mission 
 
4.3 Coordinating, Communicating, and Documenting 
 
Multi-agency missions require additional coordinating 
and communicating to complete the safety review 
process for the payload.  Frequently it is necessary to 
perform increased documentation control as well. 
 
Face-to-face meetings are very beneficial when 
communicating with other nationalities.  Approximately 
70% of communication is from body language.  In-
person meetings allow for body language and clearer 
verbal communication thus aiding in bridging the 
communication and cultural differences.  However, face-
to-face meetings with another space agency that require 
international travel are often infeasible.  NASA uses 
videoconferences with good results with international 
partners.  For all meetings, additional administrative 
planning and coordination time is necessary to connect 
with the desired parties.  Emails and written 
correspondence are used regularly, but they may not be 
the most effective way to resolve safety concerns. 
 
Documentation control in cooperative projects is also 
imperative.  Only designated individuals should control 
and update documentation that is stored in a central 
repository available to appropriate partners.  Personnel 
access to current versions of mission safety related 
documents must be controlled while being available to 
safety representatives for individual review.  Recording 
meeting minutes and making them available for the 
attendees of inter-agency meetings has proven to be an 
effective way of providing clearer understanding of 
actions, roles, and responsibilities. 
 
5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
Over the years, NASA has gained valuable payload 
safety experience related to multi-agency missions 
through developing joint requirements with the U.S. Air 
Force (NASA-STD 8719.24), working with the Trilateral 
SMA PSTF, working multi-U.S. agency missions, and 
working multi-national agency missions with other space 
agencies.  NASA has observed that payload safety 
engineering professionals of all agencies tend to have the 
same primary objective – safe payload processing and 
launch leading toward mission success.  However, 
meeting this objective takes more time—more time for 
planning, for coordinating safety reviews, understanding 
contracts and agreements, for communications and 
cultural differences, for establishing trusted and 
respected safety relationships, and to allow for additional 
training or to bring in a third party consultant.  It is our 
passion for safety and our respect of our fellow safety 
professional that motivates us to give the extra time it 
takes to ensure safe and successful multi-agency 
missions.   
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